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Designing Policies for Local Production Systems: a methodology based on evidence 
from Brazil 
  There is an enormous and varied literature dealing with industrial clusters under 
different  approaches  and  emphasizing  either  theories  to  explain  clustering  or  other 
analytical aspects like model building, structural characteristics, dynamics and evolution of 
clusters. Relatively less attention, however, is given to policy issues, especially when less-
developed countries are concerned. 
  This  paper  focuses  policy-making  for  industrial  clusters  (or  local  production 
systems – LPS), with a particular attention to less-developed countries, on the basis of 
evidence  produced  by  (1)  the  application  of  a  quantitative  methodology  to  Brazilian 
statistical data; (2) a number of case studies and (3) a survey of the institutions that support 
firms in clusters. Our aim is to develop a typology of clusters or LPS for policy purposes, 
claiming that differences in the cluster relevance for regional development and its share of 
the  industry,  production  structure,  industrial  organization,  technical  and  innovative 
capabilities, trading and governance structures, institutional infrastructure and social and 
cultural contexts, all justify different policy approaches and specific measures, according to 
different types of clusters. 
  The paper is organized as follows. First, a brief review of the literature is presented 
with  the  purpose  of  pinpointing  policy  issues.  By  no  means  it  should  be  considered  a 
comprehensive  review.  Second,  the  results  of  the  application  of  the  methodology  are 
summarized, showing the major problems that affect LPS and could be the object of policy-
measures.  Finally,  the  paper  suggests  policy  guidelines  with  some  measures  of  general 
application,  aimed  at  problems  evidenced  in  case  studies,  and  some  specific  measures 
differentiated according to the typology of local systems that resulted from the quantitative 
and other indicators. 
1.  Policy issues: a selective review of the literature 
A  great  number  of  contributions  under  different  and  complementary  approaches 
have substantially improved the knowledge about the relationships between geography and 
industry.  Most  of  the  effort  has  been  spent  on  explaining  and  characterizing  industrial 
clusters  by  way  of  purely  theoretical  work,  empirical  studies,  and  case  studies.  Policy 
implications have not been systematically discussed. Some authors are reticent, others are 
forthright in suggesting policy guidelines. This is also the case in studies related to less-
developed countries. This section summarizes those contributions in a very schematic way, 
trying  to  point  out  policy  issues.  We  understand  that  such  schematic  summary may be 
tricky, but space is a relevant dimension, especially in an academic paper. We understand 
also that there are lacunae in our focus on policy issues, but could not lose perspective. 
We classified nine groups of authors, corresponding to different and complementary 
approaches. We were tempted to label each group or approach according to schools of 
thought or institutional origin, but preferred to use catchwords that highlight the approach 
itself. The next paragraphs sum up each group without going into greater detail about the 
individual contributions. It is important to note that the classification is not intended to be 
hierarchical,  nor  chronological.  It  could  be  read  as  successive  layers  in  the  process  of 
collective learning that built the present knowledge about industrial clustering.  
Marshallian external economies 
  Alfred Marshall’s seminal analysis of English industrial districts inspired a great 
deal  of  literature  devoted  to  explain  agglomerations  of  small  firms  in  geographically   2
bounded areas. Local external economies derived from knowledge spillovers, specialized 
labor skills, and interdependencies or linkages are at the root of the explanation. 
  Several Italian authors, among them G. Becattini, S. Brusco and G. Garofoli, have 
pioneered  modern  studies  of  industrial  districts  in  Italy  since  the  late  1970s  following 
Marshall’s ideas. However, Marshallian external economies alone did not explain the origin 
and  development of Italian industrial districts. In fact, as pointed out by those authors, 
Industrial districts had special characteristics such as: a territorial concentration of a large 
number of small firms specialized in one specific industry, with an extensive division of 
labor  among  them,  embedded  in  a  local  community  with  strong socio-cultural ties that 
facilitated cooperation based on trust and local governance by private-firms organizations 
and  public  bodies.  These  special  characteristics  made  them  unique  as  forms  of  spatial 
organization  of  industrial  production.  Later  on,  evolution  in  the  1990s  changed 
substantially the structural characteristics of Italian industrial districts, turning them into 
more hierarchically organized production systems and lessening the importance of regional 
social, political and cultural ties
1. For these reasons policy recommendations based on case 
studies of Italian industrial districts are usually very cautious. 
Increasing returns and positive feedbacks 
  In late 1980s W. Brian Arthur, recovering old contributions neglected in mainstream 
economics, brought into the field the dynamic analysis of self-reinforcing mechanisms in 
spatial economics, as well as in international trade theory and in industrial organization, 
with possibilities of multiple equilibria, inefficient solutions, lock-in and path-dependence 
(Arthur, 1988). An industry location pattern may result from the location decision of the 
first firm that enters the industry, and the sequence of location decisions by subsequent 
entrant  firms.  The  first  firm  decision  is  based  “purely  on  geographical  preferences”, 
influenced by local external economies or some “historical accident”. Subsequent entrants’ 
location decisions are “based on preference modified by the benefits of locating near the 
first firm(s)”, and thus “industrial concentration becomes self-reinforcing.” One region may 
dominate the industry if there is no limit to positive feedbacks, and this may not be an 
efficient  solution.  But  usually  one  region  cannot  offer  increasing  returns  indefinitely 
because of, for instance, agglomeration diseconomies. So, other regions share the industry  
(Arthur, 1988; 1990). 
  This approach is particularly relevant for knowledge-based industries, although self-
reinforcing mechanisms influence location patterns of any industry. Arthur’s (1990) policy 
suggestions are directed to high-tech production. In his words, policies should “encourage 
industries to be aggressive in seeking out product and process improvements. They would 
strengthen the national research base on which high-tech advantages are built. They would 
encourage firms in a single industry to pool their resources in joint ventures that share 
upfront  costs,  marketing  networks,  technical  knowledge  and  compatibility  conventions. 
And they might even extend to strategic alliances among companies in several countries to 
enter  a  complex  industry  that  none  could  tackle  alone.  Increasing  returns  theory  also 
recommends paying close attention to timing when fostering research initiatives in new 
industries. There is little sense in entering a market that is already close to being locked in 
or where there are otherwise little chance of success”. 
Centripetal versus centrifugal forces 
                                                 
1 Excellent analyses of recent trends in Italian industrial districts can be found in Lazerson & Lorenzoni 
(1999) and Lombardi (2003).   3
  In the 1990s Paul Krugman (1991; 1999) modeled the so-called ‘new economic 
geography’ as a new wave in the “increasing returns-imperfect competition revolution” of 
economic  theory.  Later  on  Fujita,  Krugman  &  Venables  (1999)  extended  the  model  to 
cover spatial issues related to urban, regional e international economics. Starting with the 
three sources of Marshallian external economies – linkages, labor skills and spillovers – as 
centripetal  forces  favoring  spatial  concentration,  and  immobile  factors,  land  rents  and 
congestion  as  three  opposing  centrifugal  forces,  and  adducing  some stylized facts from 
empirical  regularities  observed  in  urban,  regional  and  industrial  location  theories,  the 
authors try to model the evolution of the spatial structure of the economy as determined by 
the confront of centripetal versus centrifugal forces. However, recognizing that the trinity 
of Marshallian external economies “has proved to be notoriously hard to model in any 
formal way” (Fujita et al. 1999: 18-19), the authors modeled just one pair of centripetal and 
centrifugal forces, namely linkages, “when producers are subject both to transport costs and 
to increasing returns”, and immobile factors. This limitation may explain why Krugman 
(1999: 105-6) and Fujita et al. (1999: 348-9) are so reticent about policy implications. 
  Commenting on Krugman (1999) paper, Paul David (1999) criticized the excessive 
reductionism of the “new economic geographers”. Considering the “complicating realities” 
of the real world, David (1999: 111) states that: “economic life is not formed by ordering 
pairs from Krugman’s locational forces – one item from the list of centripetals and the other 
from the list of centrifugals. A multiplicity of dynamic processes usually are under way 
concurrently and, that being the reality, one must venture beyond minimal heuristic models 
in order to identify which combinations are operative where, and how they interact”. Other 
criticisms by David state that: supply-side externalities should not be neglected, transport 
cost  changes  are  not  geographically  neutral,  powerful  positive  feedback  mechanisms 
attribute advantages of initial agglomeration and strong historicity to the spatial evolution 
of  the  economy,  technological  and  organizational  innovations  are  not  geographically 
neutral, and so on.  
However, more important for the purposes of this paper are David’s comments on 
policy. First of all, David (1999: 115-6) raises several policy questions not discussed by 
Krugman. Second, he states that Krugman’s “commendable caution” on policy issues may 
be justifiable by the author’s notion of the limitations of his model, in light of previous 
delusions with the policy prescriptions of new trade theories. Third, and most important, 
David calls attention to the historical fact that regional development strategies are made 
throughout the world. The real policy concern is the occurrence of “locational tournaments” 
that cause “regional failures” in the sense of outcomes that are socially inefficient because 
they  dissipate  “at  least  part  of  the  potential  agglomeration  economies  and,  in  addition, 
possibly leaving taxpayers of numerous communities burdened with debt charges incurred 
for the provision of infrastructure capacity that remained underutilized”.     
The “diamond” of competitive advantage of firms in local clusters 
  On the basis of his ‘competitive advantage of nations’ approach, M. Porter (1990; 
1998a) developed the analytical argument that the competitiveness of firms in local clusters 
is  determined  by  four  sets  of  favorable  conditions  prevailing  in  the  local  business 
environment: (1) factors of production (supply, cost, quality and specialization of inputs: 
natural  resources,  skills,  knowledge,  capital,  physical  and  science  and  technology 
infrastructures,  information  and  management  infrastructures);  (2)  demand  (sophisticated 
customers, with needs of specialized goods or services that could be also internationally 
supplied); (3) presence of suppliers and related industries and business services, and (4) a   4
context  of  rivalry  and  competition  strategies  of  local  firms.  In  such  an  environment, 
multiple  local  actors  “make  up  a  complex  web  of  relations  that  tie  firms,  customers, 
research institutions, schools and local authorities to each other. The interaction between 
economic,  socio-cultural,  political  and  institutional  actors  in  a  given  location  triggers 
learning and enhances the ability of actors to modify their behavior and find new solutions 
in response to competitive changes” (Porter & Sölvell, 1998: 443). 
Although possibly too much idealized, this is a fair characterization of localized 
externalities  and  interactions  in  well-developed  local  clusters.  When it comes to policy 
implications, however, Porter’s approach is limited to general recommendations such as: to 
ensure  the  supply  of  high  quality  inputs  (educated  citizens,  physical  infrastructure, 
information), to eliminate barriers to competition (protection of intellectual property rights, 
anti-trust laws), to stimulate the creation of norms and standards for product certification, to 
promote related businesses meetings and encourage the attraction of suppliers and service 
firms. Generally speaking, “the aim of cluster policy is to reinforce the development of all 
clusters”, and “market forces – not government decisions – should determine the outcomes” 
(Porter, 1998b: 89).   
Geography and industry are dynamically interrelated 
  Authors in the economic geography tradition have brought “plain old geography”
2 
back to the core of the debate on industrial clusters. Many authors have contributed in this 
field
3, but for the sake of objectivity we will focus the specific contribution by Scott (1998), 
adding comments on contributions by other authors whenever appropriate. Our interest in 
this specific contribution is based on two important points: first, the paper demonstrates 
quite  clearly  that industrial performance and location patterns in modern capitalism are 
intrinsically related to geography, despite globalization, and second, it strongly suggests 
that non-market coordination and public action are necessary to adjust the “social bases of 
production” of localized industrial complexes (regional industrial clusters). 
  To demonstrate that industrial performance is grounded in geography, Scott (1998: 
386) starts by arguing that: “(…) we can only start fully to decipher the locational logic of 
industrial landscape when we approach it in terms of its origins as a pure social construct, 
and  more  specifically  as  a  question  about  external  economies  and  locational 
agglomeration”. Then the argument proceeds by showing that, besides those static spatial 
issues,  constrained  by  counter-forces  (agglomeration  diseconomies)  that  limit  locational 
convergence,  complex  dynamic  and  historical  determinants  also  influence  industrial 
location.  Localized  increasing  returns  effects,  dynamic  learning  effects,  and  cumulative 
causation  characterize  the  evolution  of  regional  clusters  as a path-dependent process in 
which history, historical “accidents”, lock-in and branching points caused by radical shifts 
in markets and technologies play an important role. Next,  the  paper  characterizes  three 
historical instances of regional development associated with different forms of industrial 
organization and capitalist accumulation processes: (1) the workshop and factory system, 
which  gave  rise  to  the  classical  Marshallian  industrial  districts;  (2)  Fordist  mass-
production, leading to large lead-plants in growth-pole industries and to the formation of 
core-regions and peripheral regions, and (3) the flexible industrialization process, allowing 
                                                 
2  Expression  adapted  from  David’s  (1999:  109)  ironic  reference  to  the  “plain  old  geographers”  when 
commenting on Krugman’s (1999) “new economic geography” paper. 
3 For a critical review, see Scott (2004).   5
the  appearance  of  new  industrial  spaces,  the  resurgence  of  industrial  districts
4  and 
agglomerations, and the formation of worldwide webs of interdependence that articulate 
global business strategies with local resources and interests, specially in industries with 
modular production organization
5. The conclusion is that “Regions are once again emerging 
as  important  foci  of  production  and  as  repositories  of  specialized  know-how  and 
technological  capability,  even  as  the  globalization  of  economic  relationships  proceeds 
apace” (Scott, 1998: 394). 
  The  paper  ends  with  a  detailed  and  comprehensive  set  of  policy  considerations. 
Although  recognizing  that  market  mechanisms  are  efficient  in  activating  agglomeration 
economies,  Scott  (1998:  394-9)  considers  that  they  can  be  enhanced  by  non-market 
coordination  and  collective  action.  In  general,  regional  policies  should  aim  at  building 
institutional  infrastructures  “that  lie  outside  of  the  sphere  of  market  relations”,  and  at 
providing urban equipment, planning the use of industrial land, and mitigating pollution 
problems.  Collective  action,  in  turn,  could  bring  “significant  augmentation  of  market 
capability”  in  localized  industrial  complexes.  They  should  be  organized  to  adjust  “the 
social bases of production in at least three main fronts”, namely (1) the supply of critical 
inputs and services such as technological research, labor-training activities, information, 
marketing;  (2)  cooperation  among  local  firms  to  increase  efficiency  in  transactional 
interactions and to facilitate learning processes and pooling of technologies and labor skills. 
Cooperation  schemes  can  be  organized  as  consortia  of  local  firms  or  public-private 
partnerships under some structure of local governance, and (3) organization of forums for 
strategic choice and action to secure regional trademarks, create producer’s associations to 
manage short-term adverse conditions, and organize regional economic councils to discuss 
long-term trends and strategies. All the participants should be local “agents of collective 
order”  such  as  government  bodies,  firms’  and worker’s associations, and private-public 
consortia  and  partnerships.  Thus  all  major  local  actors  would  be  committed  and  social 
cohesion in the regional industrial cluster would be reinforced. This approach, according to 
Scott  (1998:  397),  is  cost-effective  because  it  does  not  involve  large  financial 
commitments, and it does not preclude market mechanisms from eliminating firms that fail.  
Collective efficiency 
  The  collective  efficiency  approach
6  also  emphasizes  collective  actions.  The 
argument is summarized by Schmitz & Nadvi (1999: 1504-5) by explaining that: “(…) 
Marshallian  external  economies  are  not  sufficient  to  explain  cluster  development.  In 
addition to incidental external economies, there is often a deliberate force at work, namely 
the conscious pursuit of joint action”, and so they “brought together the incidental and 
                                                 
4 Markusen (1995) has made an important contribution to the understanding of this resurgence of industrial 
districts. She analyses the “new industrial districts” (NID) as “stick places in slippery spaces” and classifies 
them in four types: (1) the Marshallian NID, with special reference to the present Italian ID; (2) the hub-and-
spoke NID; (3) the satellite industrial platform NID, and (4) the state-centered NID.   
5  Some  relevant  contributions  to  the  analysis  of  this  new  model  of  industrial  organization  are  those  by 
Sturgeon (2002), who discusses the emergence of modular production networks in the American electronics 
industry; Gerefi (1994), with a characterization of global production networks as buyer-driven and producer-
driven  chains,  and  Humphrey  &  Schmitz  (2000),  with  a  discussion  of  upgrading  strategies  when  local 
producers operate in global value chains.    
6  This  approach  was  developed  by  Hubert  Schmitz  (1995;  1997).  Later  on  Schmitz  and  Nadvi  (1999) 
reviewed the concept of collective efficiency in light of a large number of applications to several case studies, 
published in the excellent Special Issue on Industrial Clusters in Developing Countries that they edited for 
World Development, 27 (9), September 1999.   6
deliberate  effects  into  the  concept  of  collective  efficiency  defined  as  the  competitive 
advantage derived from external economies and joint action.” After the application of this 
approach to case studies in many countries, the authors concluded that collective efficiency 
can only emerge when local producers are connected to external markets through trade 
networks,  and  when  inter-firm  relations  are  subject  to  sanctions  and  sustained  by  trust 
(Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999: 1506-7). This led Schmitz and other authors in this approach to 
develop new research lines to investigate the performance of industrial clusters connected 
to global commodity or value added chains, and to discuss the role of trust in exporting 
clusters
7.    
  In their discussion of policy issues, Schmitz & Nadvi (1999: 1509-10) recover a 
previous contribution by Humphrey & Schmitz (1996) that suggests a “Triple-C Approach” 
to  policy  interventions.  According  to  those  authors,  interventions  must  be  customer-
oriented,  collective,  and  cumulative.  This  policy  approach  oriented  the  case  studies 
included in the World Development special issue on industrial clusters. The results allowed 
Schmitz & Nadvi to qualify the application and to identify deficiencies of the approach. 
They suggest that those policy principles should be applied “differently to different 
categories of clusters”, following Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer (1999) classification of three 
types of clusters: survival clusters of micro- and small-scale enterprises, more advanced 
clusters  of  differentiated  mass  producers,  and  clusters  of  transnational corporations and 
their suppliers
8. Survival clusters should be supported for employment reasons or for their 
seedbed  role  for  industrial  growth  and  entrepreneurship. Policies should stimulate local 
cooperation  and  network  formation.  More  advanced  clusters  need  policy  attention  for 
upgrading in technical learning and innovation. The first step is to “build awareness of the 
necessity to upgrade”, and then to help firms to meet international best practices through 
strategic interventions and the promotion of joint actions in technological development and 
environment upgrading (Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999: 1509-10)
9. The authors advise, however, 
that although they emphasize joint action (or private self-help), policy interventions are not 
superfluous in mature clusters. They can be aimed at reducing export barriers, imposing 
temporary import barriers, assisting firms to acquire technical know-how and to implement 
quality programs, and at mediating conflicting interests among local firms and institutions. 
The  numerous  case  studies  also  highlighted  two  important  deficiencies  of  the 
collective  efficiency  approach.  First,  it  is  not  adequate  for  capturing  cluster  external 
linkages.  This  finding  opened  an  important  agenda  for  future  research  work.  But  the 
authors took a radical view on this point, stating that “clusters only experience industrial 
growth where effective trade networks connect them to sizable distant markets and where 
trust  sustain  interfirm  relations”  (Schmitz  &  Nadvi,  1999:  1507).  In  fact  this  raises 
governance problems, which is the second deficiency pointed out by the authors in the 
collective efficiency approach. They acknowledge that the potential for conflict is higher in 
mature  clusters,  where  collective  organizations  are  more  common  and,  we  would  add, 
                                                 
7 The role of trust in exporting clusters is discussed in Schmitz (1999). Contributions to the study of cluster 
performance in global chains are summarized in the next topic of this paper.  
8 We do not intend to polemize about typologies, but Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer classification seems to be of 
little  help  for  policy  purposes.  We  would  rather  see  a  classification  based  on  cluster  growth  potential, 
capabilities for innovation, insertion in the regional economy, share of the industry employment or value 
added, production structure, industrial organization, market channels, and social embeddedness.  
9 Not surprisingly there is no mention of policy objectives for the third type of clusters. Usually clusters 
commanded by transnational corporations leave little room for policy-making.    7
where hybrid structures are present, with some firms engaged in external networks and 
others  operate  in  their  own,  external  or  domestic,  market  channels.  This  gave  another 
important clue for future research – governance structures –, which has been explored by a 
number of authors. 
Governance structures, agglomerations and global chains 
  Many  authors  have  made  important  contributions  to  the  study  of  forms  of 
governance  in  territorial  agglomerations  of  firms  or  local  production  systems
10.  It  is 
impossible to review those contributions in detail in this paper. Instead, we will highlight 
policy issues that stem from some of the papers. 
  From a policy-maker point of view, the most important analytical contributions in 
this literature are: (1) the taxonomic classification of production structures in territorial 
agglomerations and their relationships with governance structures; (2) the characterization 
of global commodity chains or production networks and their connection with successful 
exporting  clusters  under  chain  or  network  governance;  (3)  the  emphasis  on  local 
governance, even if as a complementary action by local actors. Policy issues stemming 
from those analytical constructions can be summarized as follows. 
  Storper  &  Harrison’s  (1991)  paper  offers  a  comprehensive  classification  of 
production systems that are differentiated according to the division of labor, the size of 
firms  and  their  inter-relationships  and  territorial  agglomeration,  and  then  connects  this 
classification of production structures to different forms of governance. The result is the 
well-known set of four types of governance structures, namely all-ring, no core; core-ring 
with coordinating firm; core-ring with lead firm, and all-core, no ring. At the root of this 
typology  are  structural  characteristics  such  as  hierarchy,  leadership  and  command,  as 
opposed to market relationships and cooperation, which define the space for policy action. 
When Storper & Harrison (1991: 419-20) come to policy discussion they recognize that, 
although the region may be formed by a complex set of production systems, “in most cases 
the ‘view from the region’ is different from the standpoint of the production system, and it 
is  the  regional  standpoint  that  must  inform  local  policy  makers”.  Thus,  the  degree  of 
division of labor, the degree of hierarchy, and whether connections among firms are local 
or non-local are the relevant dimensions for policy-making
11. 
  After  Gerefi’s  (1994;  1999)  analysis  of  producer-driven  and  buyer-driven  global 
commodity  chains,  Humphrey  &  Schmitz  (2000)  and  other  authors,  following  the  clue 
about  the  need  of  governance  studies  made  by  the  works  in  the  collective  efficiency 
approach, made several contributions on the implications of local-global interactions for 
cluster  upgrading.  Humphrey  &  Schmitz’s  (2000)  paper  is  very  important  for  policy 
discussion because it adds a new layer in the theoretical construction of cluster analysis: the 
interaction of global value chain governance and local governance. The central question 
addressed  in  their  paper  is  “whether  insertion  in  global  value  chains  enhances  or 
undermines  local  upgrading  strategies”.  Three  stages  of  upgrading  are  considered:  in 
production,  in  marketing,  and  in  strategic  functions  such  as  design  and  own  brand 
manufacture.  A  new  notion  of  chain  coordination  is  introduced:  the  quasi-hierarchy 
                                                 
10 See for instance Storper & Harrison (1991), Markusen (1995), Gerefi (1994; 1999), Humphrey & Schmitz 
(2000), Dolan & Humphrey (2000), Schmitz (2000), Sturgeon (1997; 2002), and Lombardi (2003).  
11  The  paper  ends  up  discussing  possible  policy  problems  for  specific  areas  included  in  each  type  of 
governance structure. This discussion is referred to developed countries’ production systems and will not be 
commented upon in this paper.   8
governance,  which  describes  more  properly  developing  countries’  asymmetrical  cluster 
structures  participating  in  global  value  chains
12.  Local  governance  and  local  industrial 
policy can help in different ways according to different cluster upgrading strategies. In case 
the  strategy  aims  merely  at  strengthening  the  existing  position  of  the  cluster,  then 
governance  can  take  the  form  of  (1)  collective  initiatives  to  promote  upgrading  in 
production through, for example, the creation of a local technology institute, and upgrading 
in marketing through, for example, the formation of an export consortium, or (2) hub-and-
spoke  structure  in  which  upgrading  in  production  and  in  marketing  depend  on  R&D 
activities and opening up of new markets by the local lead firm. In this case local industrial 
policy could play a role in “expanding infrastructure and strengthening training, testing and 
certification facilities” (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000: 28-29). But when the strategy aims at 
repositioning  the  cluster  through  functional  upgrading,  “local  industrial  policy  requires 
building a coalition of the key actors in the public and private sector” (p. 29). Business 
associations and lead firms in more symmetrical networks can be major players in such 
coalitions.  Other  essential  policy  ingredients  are  local  institutional  support,  firms’  own 
strategies for functional upgrading and, at higher policy levels, human resource formation 
and concurrent national industrial policy
13.   
Geography of innovation and agglomeration 
The  correlation  between  geography  and  innovation  has  been  demonstrated 
empirically by several authors
14. Feldman (1993; 1994) and Audretsch & Feldman (1996), 
for example, show that there is a clear relationship between the localization of innovative 
activities,  measured  in  terms  of  the  number  of  patent  citations,  and  the  geographical 
concentration  of  innovative  inputs  such  as  R&D  in  universities,  industrial  R&D,  the 
presence of related industries, and the presence of firms that provide specialized business 
services, demonstrating the importance of “geographically mediated spillovers”. They also 
show that there is an important correlation between the location of innovation production 
and the location of industry value added, but that it is the presence of related industries that 
is more relevant to innovation activities, indicating the significance of regional innovation 
systems. 
There  are  in  fact  several  schools  of  thought  with  different  approaches  to  the 
theoretical and empirical explanation of the relations between geography and innovation, 
including the formation of geographically concentrated clusters of firms in many economic 
activities, but above all in technology-based industries
15. For the purpose of this paper, it 
will suffice to summarize the key points that are common to several approaches, and to 
highlight some policy issues. 
The foundation shared by all the approaches discussed here is the perception that 
geographical  proximity  facilitates  the  transmission  of  new  knowledge  characterized  as 
complex, tacit, and specific to certain production and innovation systems and activities. 
                                                 
12 The authors state that “the more clusters are integrated into global markets, the more heterogeneous they 
become and the more they move towards a hub-and-spoke organization in which the lead firms become the 
gatekeepers of both material and knowledge flows” (Humprhey & Schmitz, 2000: 29). 
13  We  have  evidence  on  independent  firms  in  asymmetrical  governance  structures  which  made  strategic 
moves to escape from global chain networks and have been able to advance in functional upgrading, acquiring 
design and product development capabilities, and are now operating in their own market channels with their 
own brand names. See section 2. 
14 See Feldman (2000) for a review of the main contributions. 
15 For an introductory discussion of these approaches, see Breschi & Malerba (2001).   9
This may seem paradoxical in the age of information and communication technology but, 
as noted by Audretsch & Thurik (2001), it is important not to confuse knowledge with 
information.  While  the  marginal  cost  of  transmitting  information  is  not  proportional  to 
distance,  the  cost  of  transmitting  knowledge,  especially tacit knowledge, increases with 
distance.  This  type  of  knowledge  is  best  transmitted  through  interpersonal  contacts, 
frequent  interaction,  and  mobility  of  workers  from  one  firm  to  another.  Hence  the 
advantage of geographically concentrated configurations of production such as clusters. 
However,  although  all  approaches  have  this  common  foundation,  two  groups  of 
approaches can be distinguished by their emphasis on differing mechanisms of knowledge 
transmission.  One  group,  comprising  the  innovation  economics  and  innovative  systems 
approaches,
16 attributes a key role to spillovers in the transmission of knowledge among 
neighboring firms. These spillovers are triggered by innovative firms or institutions that 
generate  new  knowledge.  The  other  group,  comprising  approaches  based  on  regional 
economics, seeks to explain what makes firms localized in clusters more innovative than 
isolated  firms.  In  doing  so  these  authors  emphasize  a  different  set  of  key  factors  in 
knowledge transmission. According to Breschi & Malerba (2001: 819-820), the main points 
of  these  approaches  are  as  follows:  (1)  learning  through  networking  and  interacting, 
including  user-producer  relationships,  formal  and  informal  collaborations,  inter-firm 
mobility of skilled workers, and spin-offs of new firms from existing firms, universities and 
research  centers;  (2)  the  deep  embeddedness  of  local  firms  in  a  very  thick  network  of 
knowledge sharing, supported by close social interactions and facilitated by shared norms, 
conventions and codes, and in institutions that build trust and encourage informal relations 
among  actors  in  a  collective  learning  process;  (3)  the  availability  of  a  common  set  of 
resources,  such  as  universities,  research  centers,  technology  centers,  and  a  pool  of 
specialized and skilled labor, all of which help reduce the costs and uncertainties associated 
with innovative activities. 
  Policy issues are framed in this literature by those key points. Breschi & Malerba 
(2001),  on  the  basis  of  several  contributions  to  the  Industrial  and  Corporate  Change 
Special Issue on The Geography of Innovation and Economic Clustering
17, summarize the 
policy  conclusions  by  stating  that:  “papers  presented  in  this  special  issue  show  a 
remarkable convergence in pointing out the ineffectiveness of public policies attempting to 
direct the formation of new clusters through top-down interventions, such as technopoles, 
science parks and firm incubators. Rather, government policies can play a very important 
role in clusters by accommodating the formation of new firms, investment in education and 
the provision of supportive infrastructures”. 
  Besides  being  very general, such policy recommendations are mostly referred to 
developed countries. There is no evidence that in less-developed countries technopoles, 
science parks and firm incubators are equally ineffective. Some detailed policy guidelines 
are  suggested  in  the  individual  papers  in  ICC  Special  Issue,  pointing  out  the  need  of 
supportive  social  capital,  including  institutions,  entrepreneurial  services,  venture  capital 
funds, active research universities, multinational investments, export orientation, and so on. 
                                                 
16 The systems approach includes national, regional, sectoral and local innovation systems and technological 
systems.  
17 For the purpose of policy discussion the most relevant contributions are those by Bresnahan, Gambardella 
& Saxenian (2001); Feldman (2001); Saxenian & Hsu (2001), Maskell (2001), and Cooke (2001).   10
  On the other hand, Audretsch (1998) is more emphatic on the role of public policies 
in the location of innovative activities. He sees two fundamental shifts in public policies: 
(1) in the policy focus, “away from the traditional triad of policy instruments essentially 
constraining the freedom of firms to contract – regulation, competition policy or antitrust in 
the  USA,  and  public  ownership  of  business”  (to)  “a  new  policy  approach  (…)  which 
focuses on enabling the creation and commercialization of knowledge. Examples of such 
policies  include  encouraging  R&D,  venture  capital  and  new-firm  start-ups”;  (2)  in  the 
“locus of such enabling policies, which are increasingly at state, regional, or even local 
level” (Audretsch, 1998: 26). The author concludes by characterizing these changes as “a 
silent policy revolution currently under way” (p.27). 
Systemic and evolutionary nature of local production systems  
  In the last decade a new, cognitive and evolutionary approach to analyze industrial 
districts or local production systems has been developed. The most important contributions 
on this line of thought are those by Bellussi (1995; 2000), Belussi & Gottardi (2000), and 
Lombardi (2000; 2003)
18. Our discussion will be centered in Lombardi’s contribution. 
  In Lombardi’s (2003) paper the new theoretical framework is explained in great 
detail. Although specifically referred to the Italian industrial districts, the framework takes 
into  account  international  trends  in  industrial  organization,  technical  change  and 
competition,  which  affect  local  production  systems  (LPS)  all  over  the  world.  For  this 
reason,  the  essential  elements  of  Lombardi’s  analysis  may  be  considered  as  generally 
applicable. 
  The paper analyses the evolution of Italian LPS in the last three decades as the result 
of the “dynamic matching between systemic properties of (…) LPS and the characteristics 
of the competitive environment” Lombardi (2003: 1443). After a stylized description of the 
evolutionary  phases  in  the  development  of  traditional  LPS,  the  author  discusses  the 
evolutionary dynamics of LPS, which he characterizes as adaptive, self-organized, complex 
systems of collective order
19. In such complex systems, he argues, evolution is determined 
by “how information and knowledge flows are created and organized” (p.1444). Thus the 
focus  of  the  approach  is  on  the  key  idea  of  the  “centrality  of  information”  in  the 
“interactions between agents and entities which exercise functions” that must be specified 
by information and knowledge (p.1444). Information asymmetries between strategic agents, 
who  have  access  to  market  trends  and  other  information,  and  operational  units  in  the 
production  network,  produce  an  “informational  divide”.  The  strategic  agents  become 
holders  of  hidden  information,  which  they  translate  into  parametric  information for the 
operational units. Coordination is automatic, organized by an “invisible mind”.  
  The  informational  divide  turned  traditional  LPS  incapable  to  innovate,  since 
technological choices and investment decisions are made by operational units which do not 
have access to market information. Thus, when new competitive factors became relevant in 
the last 15 years, the systemic properties and the adaptive behavior of LPS were weakened. 
A  new  cognitive  architecture  then  emerges,  in  which  the  informational  divide  tends  to 
                                                 
18 On similar lines, but not strictly related to the cognitive approach, is the excellent paper by Lazerson & 
Lorenzoni (1999). 
19 Lombardi’s paper draws on a great number of contributions by other authors on this line as well as on other 
approaches like complex systems analysis, cognitive science, evolutionary systems, industrial organization, 
regional science… For reasons of brevity we are not going to trail his sources and influences in this paper.   11
disappear,  the  techno-organizational  structures  become  vertically  integrated,  and 
coordination becomes explicitly designed as “more visible minds” (Lombardi, 2003). 
  Policy  issues  are  not  discussed  in  Lombardi’s  paper.  The  only  suggestion  is  to 
create special agencies to help LPS to adapt to the new trends. The agencies would perform 
two main roles: (1) in the supply of infrastructure, logistics and other public services or 
goods. This would be a systemic function that would reinforce the LPS systemic properties; 
(2) in the “strategic coordination of operators, through associations of firms, consortiums, 
etc”.  In  this  function,  the  agency  would  reinforce  the  evolutionary  trend  towards  the 
centralization of decision-making (Lombardi, 2003: 1459). 
  It seems plausible that, as long as industrial clusters in developing countries are 
affected by those evolutionary trends – as appears to be the case – they should design 
policies to improve the clusters capacity to innovate, both in product differentiation and in 
industrial organization. Belussi (2000) is more emphatic on the need of such policies, but 
her work is also referred to Italian LPS. Focusing on learning processes in knowledge-
intensive LPS, she draws a detailed outline of specific policy options to mobilize and create 
new  knowledge  and  for  the  coordination  and  distribution  of  technical  information, 
production of codes and languages for interpreting knowledge, reinforcement of the local 
identity  and  production  of  culture,  and  preservation of specific accumulated knowledge 
(Belussi,  2000:  121-2).  These  are  undoubtedly  useful  general  guidelines,  but  a  policy 
agenda  for  clusters  in  developing  countries  should  be  necessarily  ample  in  scope  and 
extended to all types of industrial clusters. 
1.  Methodology and evidence from its application 
Designed with the specific purpose of producing evidence for cluster policy-making 
in  Brazil,  our  methodology  comprises  four  consecutive  steps:  (1)  the  application  of 
quantitative  indicators  for  the  identification  and  structural  characterization  of  industrial 
clusters;  (2)  the  use  of  regionalized  quantitative  indicators  of  innovation  inputs  and 
outcomes  as  proxies  for  the  regional  distribution  of  industrial  clusters’  innovative 
capabilities; (3) the statistical account of the regional distribution of educational systems, 
labor training courses, laboratories, research centers, and technology support institutions as 
a proxy for regional or local capabilities, and (4) the field research work, collecting data 
and information about the local production system as a whole and the firms that operate in 
it. This section focuses the results of several applications of our methodology
20. Specific 
indicator formulas and other methodological details can be seen in our previous works, 
especially Suzigan et al. (2003; 2004; 2005) and Suzigan (2005). 
The application of our methodology allowed us to map a great number of industrial 
clusters,  to  characterize  their  production  structure  in  statistical  terms,  and  to  suggest  a 
typology  of  LPS  (see  section  3).  Additionally,  it  brought  evidence  on  the  regional 
distribution  of  ST&I  activities,  and  of  firms’  supporting  institutions. The results of the 
statistical work, plus the evidence on ST&I activities and on institutions, informed field 
research work in a selected number of LPS, producing case studies with a rich and varied 
spectrum of system features and problems. 
                                                 
20 Case studies have been made in eight states, covering several manufacturing industries (leather and shoe, 
furniture, jewelry, information and communication equipment, ceramics, medical equipment, clothing, marble 
stones,  wood  products,  agriculture  machinery,  plastics)  and  software.  Approximately  400  firms  and 
institutions have been visited in the last five years.    12
  The results offer strong evidences not only to support our quantitative methods but 
also to confirm the various theoretical approaches. A stylized description of the cases we 
have studied may be summarized as follows. All of them have deep historical roots: they 
started either by some historical accident, e.g. the development of local skills or knowledge, 
or by initial conditions related to, e.g., a pioneer entrepreneur, the presence of education 
and research institutions. External economies attract the first firms. A development process 
is ensued when the site becomes an attractive location in the investment decisions of other 
firms in the industry, forming an agglomeration. As it grows, supplying regional markets, 
the  agglomeration  of  firms  becomes  attractive  to  other  related  industries.  Local  inter-
relationships  in  production  increase,  facilitating  cooperation  with  suppliers,  knowledge 
spillovers among firms, and collective actions to organize business associations and labor 
unions. As local production structure diversifies to include suppliers of raw materials, parts 
and  equipment,  a  greater  division  of  labor  takes  place  and  a  sophisticated  industrial 
organization is shaped, with more inter-relationships in production that, in turn, enhances 
learning  processes,  but  with  fewer  horizontal  interactions  and  cooperation.  Increasing 
returns reinforces the process and stimulates new firm entries. Competition increases and 
new  competitive  factors  other  than  price  become  relevant.  Local  firms  increase  their 
demand for higher skills and for technical and technological services that would enable 
them to improve their capacity to differentiate their products and to develop new products 
and processes. Professionals, institutions and firms providing those services are attracted. 
Some firms become dominant for their capacity to control market information, to open new 
domestic or international market channels, and to dominate strategic assets like capabilities 
in R&D and brand names. The morphology of the system tends to change, and some form 
of governance is established, either by system self-regulating mechanisms or by intentional 
planning. In the latter case governance may be exercised by local dominating firms with 
their  own  market  channels,  production  networks  and  brand  names,  or  by  domestic  or 
international firms controlling buyer- or producer-driven commodity or value chains. 
  The results have also produced useful evidence on problems usually affecting most 
of the LPS. To facilitate policy-making discussion, the problems are summarized below 
first at system level and then at firm level. They are generally present in some degree in all 
types of LPS. 
  At system level there are five major problems, which could be the object of policy 
measures or collective action. The first has to do with infrastructures. In most cases there is 
no  planning  of  land  use  for  industrial  plants  and  residences.  The  urban  area  becomes 
congested, urban infrastructures deteriorate, transportation costs increase, logistic problems 
start to weaken firms’ competitiveness, and agglomeration diseconomies halts LPS growth 
and development. This is aggravated by additional urban infrastructure problems related to 
water supply, sewage, and pollution. Other more general infrastructure problems like the 
cost  and  quality  of  highway  transportation  and  port  services  also  diminish  firms’ 
competitiveness. The latter is a regional or state policy-making problem, but local firms and 
government bodies can act politically to get the state government to improve roads and port 
services. 
  The second major problem at system level is the insufficient development of local 
institutions. In general, local government bodies are not relevant actors in the LPS studied, 
but this is a political and cultural, rather than a policy-making problem. More important 
from  a  policy-making  point  of  view  is  the  insufficiency  of  local  technology-service 
institutions, collective R&D centers and laboratories, and local-specific technology-focused   13
degree courses
21. Local educational systems are also weak in the supply of undergraduate 
and graduate management and business administration courses. Labor training, on the other 
hand, is well structured in most LPS, either by firms’ on-the-job training schemes or by 
technical and professional schools. 
  The third usual problem at system level is the absence of a collective organization to 
deal with crises and evolutionary trends. All studied LPS had at some time to overcome 
crises caused by domestic or international market trends, or to face major technological or 
organizational  changes,  and  usually  the  crises  were  lengthened  and  deepened  and  the 
adaptation to changes was slow for lack of an adequate forum to discuss this kind of system 
problem, which also impairs foresight and strategic actions of a collective nature. In some 
cases organizational changes like the decision of firms to enter a production or value chain 
network  breaks  the  LPS  social  cohesion  and  undermines  trustful  relations.  The 
consequences are increasing difficulties for collective actions with a view to, e.g., create an 
export  consortium  or  a  technology  services  center,  and  more  generally  for  local 
governance.     
The fourth problem is precisely governance. Evolutionary changes produced hybrid 
structures in most of the LPS studied, in the same way and by the same mechanisms as 
those observed by Humphrey & Schmitz (2000) and Lombardi (2003). Hybrid structures 
brought with them hybrid forms of governance. Usually there is a structural divide of firms: 
on  one  side  are  some  large,  lead  firms  that  either  operate  their  own  network  of  local 
producers and have their own market channels, or are themselves producers for domestic or 
international buyers or subcontractors, and on the other side are a great number of small (in 
some  places  also  large)  independent  firms.  The  firms  in  first  segment  have  their  own 
governance structure or are subordinated to external, domestic or international governance 
structure.  The  firms  in  the  second  segment  usually  have  greater  and  varied  local 
interactions, are socially more embedded, being as they usually are the product of spin-offs 
from other local firms, and tend to cooperate or act collectively. But in many LPS that we 
have visited the initiatives of small firms of the second segment are impaired by the firms 
of  the  first  segment,  which  usually  have  the  political  control  of  the  local  business 
association
22.  So,  what  is  the  policy  problem?  It  is  to  make  possible  for  the  small, 
independent firms to organize themselves in a local governance structure. We suggest that 
the best way to do that is for firms to have a coordinating agent to organize collective 
actions and to bridge local firms and institutions with state or federal government financial 
or technological institutions
23.  
                                                 
21 In some LPS the interaction with the educational system is better focused. For example, the ICT industry 
cluster  of  Campinas  (SP)  benefits  from  courses  in  that  industry  area  at  UNICAMP  (State Universtity of 
Campinas) and other local educational institutions. ICT firms in Campinas also interact intensively with the 
local R&D centers and labs, which have been historically present in the region. In Votuporanga (SP), the 
furniture LPS has managed to create a specific furniture technology degree course in a local university. 
22 The most conspicuous example is that of Franca (SP), a men’s leather shoe manufacturing LPS, where 
several initiatives of smaller, independent firms, to organize collective actions were sabotaged by the large, 
dominating firms that are subcontracted producers for international buyers.  
23 We base our suggestion in the most successful experience of a group of 25 small firms from Votuporanga 
who hired a coordinator to manage them out of a crisis. The coordinator organized a total quality control 
program,  introduced  management  best  practices,  helped  to  create  a  course  of  furniture  manufacturing 
technology in the local university, and managed the financing and establishment of a technology, R&D and 
labor training center that became the second most important in the country. The results were production 
growth, increasing exports, and technological progress, with several firms ISO certified.    14
Finally,  the  fifth  problem  at  system  level,  although  not  in  all  of  the  LPS,  is 
environmental pollution. The LPS of industries that produce toxic residues or effluents, 
such as leather and shoes, leather products, and jewelry, or that explore natural resources, 
such as ceramic tiles and wood furniture, must not only comply with state environment 
legislation  but  also  have  their  own  environment control policy in order to avoid social 
costs.  Problems  are  aggravated  where  the  number  of  informal  firms  is  larger.  Cluster 
policies could stimulate firms and local governments to build adequate disposal sites, to 
treat effluents in the industrial plant, and to exploit only environmentally certified natural 
resources. 
At firms level the problems are more numerous, albeit easier to solve from the point 
of view of policies. Some of them have the same origin as those at system level. They have 
been observed in all LPS that we have visited. The most frequently observed problems are 
listed and briefly commented upon in the next paragraph.  
  One of the problems that affect most firms and especially small firms are those 
related to plant layout and to production and technology bottlenecks. Production lines are 
inefficiently organized, increasing production time, or are bottlenecked because of one or 
more equipment with incompatible production capacity or inadequate technology. Another 
frequently observed problem is the deficiency in management and business administration. 
Many  entrepreneurs  are  former  blue-collar  workers  who  acquire  only  rudimentary 
knowledge in those areas. Thus, many small firms are cost-inefficient and badly managed. 
A third problem is that most of the small firms, but some of the large ones too, are trapped 
in competition based on low prices, usually combined with large quantities of production 
and  standard  quality.  That  happens  because  they  get  locked-in  into  subordinate  trade 
relations  with  retailers  or  network  producers  and  into  inferior  technologies.  Fourth,  as 
price-competition  becomes  fiercer,  firms  tend  to  be  unwilling  to  cooperate,  although 
production inter-relations and learning interactions continue to exist. This makes collective 
actions  more  improbable.  Fifth,  there  is  a  general  deficiency  in  the  so-called  strategic 
assets:  R&D  structures,  product  development  knowledge,  design,  patenting,  and  brand 
names. Again, firms producing for supply chains or production networks, although they 
manage to upgrade in production, they fail to develop capabilities in those strategic assets
24. 
Sixth, although information and communication technologies have been widely diffused 
lately, most firms still find it difficult or costly to gather information on new products, 
technologies and market trends.
25. Seventh, quality problems are widespread. Firms, above 
all small firms, tend to focus end-of-production line quality control, with a considerable 
rate of rejection and re-elaboration. There is insufficient quality control in the production 
chain, and few firms get ISO certificates. Eighth, there is a general scarcity of specialized 
                                                 
24 The case of Franca comes to mind once more. Most of the large firms producing for foreign buyers are 
technically upgraded but devote much less attention to product and process innovations. Independent, small 
and large firms, on the other hand, are innovative and successful in opening their own market channels with 
their own brand names all over the world. The same happens in other LPS such as Votuporanga (furniture) 
and Limeira (SP) (jewelry). 
25 A creative solution was found in Birigui (SP), a LPS that manufactures children shoes made predominantly 
from synthetic material. There, a specialized-service firm was created by a former manufacturer, who travels 
abroad  twice  a  year  to  gather  information  on  new  products  and  market  trends  for  a  number  of  local 
manufacturers. Data and information are then compacted in a CD-ROM and supplied to the manufacturers, 
who pay a fraction of the cost they would have to pay to collect those data and information by themselves. 
The service was so successful that it was extended to firms in other similar clusters in the country, which was 
of course against the interests of the local manufacturers.   15
professionals or firms in services related to the local production. This includes design, total 
quality  control,  production  management  methods,  and  professionals  like  laboratory 
technicians,  financial  managers  and  other  business  administration  specialists.  Ninth, 
environmental problems: in LPS where production processes generates toxic residues and 
effluents, environmental control at plant level is usually deficient. 
2.  Policy-making for local production systems: a suggested approach 
The body of evidence produced by the application of our methodology, with the 
background of the theoretical and analytical framework discussed in section 1, offers secure 
bases for suggesting an approach to policy-making for LPS. Although referred to Brazil, we 
hope  that  this  approach  can  serve  as  a  guide  for  discussion  of  policy-making  for  the 
development of LPS in general. 
Some  basic  principles  are  needed:  First  of  all,  the  methodological  approach  we 
developed,  by  mapping  and  characterizing existing LPS, respects market principles and 
private decisions and does not consider it feasible simply to create LPS. Thus, policies 
should never have this objective. Secondly, some general principles must be observed: (1) 
Policies  must  offer  the  conditions  for  local  actors  –  firms,  entrepreneurs,  workers, 
government  bodies,  private  institutions,  and  society  –  to  make  use  of  their  capacity  to 
mobilize the system to favor development. That means policies should never substitute for 
local actors, and must avoid measures that could inhibit the autonomous development of the 
system and its social forces; (2) Policies must require local actors to commit themselves to 
policy measures either by contributing with a fraction of the allocated public resources, or 
by  taking  up  complementary  collective  actions;  (3)  Specific  policy  measures  must  be 
differentiated  by  types  of  LPS  and  according  to  their  stage  of  development. There are, 
however, some policy measures of general application to all kinds of LPS. Keeping those 
principles in mind, and considering the LPS problems evidenced by our case studies, the 
remainder of this section develops some suggested policy guidelines.  
Policy measures of general application 
At first, policies should address general problems that are common to most of the 
LPS. These include: (1) the five areas in which we identified problems at system level, 
namely infrastructures, local institutions, organization for strategic actions, governance, and 
environment pollution, and (2) some problems that usually affect the efficiency of almost 
all firms. Why are those two kinds of general policy measures necessary?  
By tackling infrastructure problems, the policy would eliminate sources of external 
diseconomies to local firms. In order to do that, it would be necessary first to identify those 
sources of external diseconomies and then mobilize local actors to invest and/or to find the 
means  of  bringing  investors  in.  Financial  mechanisms  or  incentives  could  be  adequate 
instruments to start the process. 
Deficiencies  in  services  related  to  the  main  local  economic  activity,  which  are 
provided by institutions, increases firms’ costs of labor training, R&D and other technology 
and managing activities, and limit firms’ abilities to absorb new knowledge and to develop 
learning processes. Policy measures in this area should facilitate the assessment of such 
deficiencies  and  offer  support  for  the  development  of  existing  institutions  or  for  the 
establishment of those that could match the needs of the LPS.   16
General policy measures should also stimulate local actors to organize some form of 
collective organization for the discussion of problems and long-term trends
26. This would 
help them to anticipate major crises and evolutionary changes, and to limit their costs by 
finding collective forms of strategic action. In addition, the system social cohesion would 
be strengthened and the building of trust reinforced. 
Policies aimed at the governance of the system should focus on small firms and give 
them  support  to  organize  a  local  governance  structure  of  their  own.  The  role  of  a 
coordinator, a leading local entrepreneur or a hired professional, may be decisive for the 
success of this initiative. It would help in building ties that could lead to joint actions in 
exports,  gathering  of  information  on  market  trends,  creation  of  a labor training school, 
establishment of a R&D and technology services center, and other related activities. 
Finally, system level environmental policies should include regulations that require 
the local public sector and firms associations to build disposal sites, and firms to introduce 
pollution control equipments and effluent treatment systems at plant level. In addition to 
that,  a  clause  should  condition  the  benefit  of  any  policy  measure  to  compliance  to 
government environmental norms and regulations. 
Firm level general policies, on the other hand, should aim at eliminating the most 
common sources of inefficiencies observed in case studies. In all LPS there is need of 
professional services to assist in methods of planning and control of production processes, 
total quality control, and other related techniques. There is also a general need of courses in 
management practices and business administration methods. Equally necessary in almost 
all LPS are information systems that enable firms to follow market trends, technologies, 
export  markets,  and  other  relevant  sources  of  information.  Capabilities  in  product 
development  and  in  other  strategic  functions  are  equally  needed,  and  policies  could 
stimulate upgrading in these areas. 
Policies differentiated by types of LPS  
Local production systems have characteristics that enable them to be raised to the 
status of industrial, regional and social development vectors. Moreover, they can also make 
a valuable contribution to the effort to enhance the nation’s balance of payments if their 
production capacity can be complemented with new capabilities in trade and if they are 
directed to new markets.  
While there is broad agreement on the importance of local production systems, this 
consensus  is  lacking  with  regard  to  how  these  clusters  should  be  quantified  and 
qualitatively assessed on an industry-wide and regional basis. How many LPS are there in 
each  region  or  in  the  entire  country?  How  important  are  they  and  what  are  their chief 
characteristics? Questions such as these have received unsystematic answers and research 
findings in this field are often uneven or downright contradictory. 
Using  the  methodology  developed  and  based  on  the  results  obtained,  four  basic 
types of LPS have been characterized. The first type comprises LPS that stand out for two 
reasons: they are enormously important to a region and also to the respective industry. The 
dual importance of these LPS for a region and the sectors to which they belong makes them 
centers of industrial and regional development. Alongside these doubly important LPS, 
there are systems which are of enormous importance to a particular industry or group of 
                                                 
26 This is in agreement with Scott’s (1998: 396) suggestion for the creation of “forums for strategic choice and 
action”, and with Lombadi’s (2003: 1459) similar suggestion for the “creation of agencies specialized in 
favoring the adaptation of decentralized production systems to radical challenges”.     17
industries (as reflected in their share of production and employment) but are as it were 
diluted  in  a  much  larger,  more  diversified  economic  fabric:  despite  their  considerable 
importance  to  industry,  regional  economic  development  does  not  depend  on  them  so 
strongly. Several typical LPS sectors have sizable portions of production and employment 
located in regions with such a diversified economic fabric that their local contribution is far 
smaller: the region is important to the sector but the sector is less important to the region. 
This  occurrence  is  typically  associated  with  large  industrialized  cities  and  above  all 
metropolitan areas. These LPS can be considered highly developed, not least because they 
have very significant complementary resources, and hence they can be termed advanced 
vectors. If these local systems are important to an industry or group of industries but not to 
a region, there are others in precisely the opposite situation: they are important to a region 
but do not make a decisive contribution to the main industry to which they belong. This 
configuration represents above all a vector of local development. Lastly, there is a type of 
LPS that has little importance for its industry and coexists with other economic activities in 
the region. It represents as it were an embryonic local production system. 
This typology may be valuable when formulating a comprehensive and consistent 
industrial policy for the highly diverse LPS universe. Policy measures designed to foster 
development of LPS would have to be tailored according to the characteristics of each type. 
Some  general  guidelines  are  suggested  below  on  the  basis  of  the  previously  discussed 
evidence.  
Centers of industrial and regional development have developed vigorously and have 
a long history in almost every case. Given the intrinsic characteristics of this development 
process their manufacturing dimension is hyper-developed in relation to their commercial 
functions,  including  marketing.  For  this  very  reason  an  appropriate  industrial  policy 
designed to help these systems reach a higher stage of development and competitiveness 
would  include  a  combination  of  commercial  and  industrial  functions  geared  to  moving 
beyond dependency on channels and other forms of selling, and to encouraging a focus on 
product development, brand names, patent registration, design, certification, and quality. 
Overcoming subordinate market insertion and a production function tied to high volume 
coupled with low price requires integrated and consistent development in both dimensions. 
The industrial policy “package” offered to systems of this type should include these two 
aspects  and  treat  them  in  an  integrated  manner.  A  typical  strategy  for  promoting  these 
centers  of  industrial  and  regional  development would include education and training in 
higher technical skills and autonomous selling and marketing capabilities. The former can 
be provided by extending the present education and training facilities, but the latter involve 
bringing  together  dispersed  competencies  and  setting  up  new  business  associations  or 
special legal vehicles.  
Embryonic  local  production  systems  are  the  most  numerous  type,  although  the 
number of cases can be reduced if more rigorous filters are included in the methodology. If 
the resources required for a policy of fomenting these embryonic LPS can be considered 
modest in individual terms, the number of such LPS and the probable incipient nature of 
the local fabric of organizations entails greater risks. Thus the industrial policy package for 
embryonic LPS should be associated with a concatenated sequence of conditioned stages, 
each clearly requiring matching local contributions in the form of funds, resources or some 
other  involvement.  Although  embryonic  LPS  are  diametrically  opposite  to  the  previous 
type described above (centers of industrial and regional development) in several respects, it 
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all  the  developmental  stages  of  their  developed  “predecessors”.  After  all,  today  these 
veterans find themselves in the “blind alley” of high volume and low prices, and it will be 
no easy task to find a way out. To avoid this trap industrial policy must from the beginning 
take pains to encourage embryonic LPS to conduct market research that will help identify 
segments or even niche markets capable of being exploited by coordinated promotional 
activities. This is the best way to sidestep the temptation to focus on mere expansion of 
production  capacity  and  downward  competition,  which  drives  down  prices  and  quality. 
Industrial  policy  should  include  coordinated  measures  to  provide  the  conditions  for 
acquiring the necessary technical and production-related capabilities for them to develop 
these market segments.  
The systems comprised by local development vectors are those industrial policy is 
best equipped to foment. On one hand they have passed the embryonic stage and have the 
critical mass for their local importance to be recognized. On the other they do not yet face 
the difficulties inherent in centers of industrial and regional development, such as having to 
act as trailblazers and possibly make mid-course corrections. Because they are at a certain 
distance from these centers, local development vectors can avoid repeating mistakes and 
more easily identify opportunities. Their main challenge is to build a trajectory on the basis 
of sporadic or localized opportunities.  
Advanced  vectors,  unlike  all  the  other  types  mentioned,  pose  considerable 
difficulties for policy makers aiming to integrate them with a predominant dimension of 
regional  development.  They  have  minimal  significance  in  regions  normally  much  more 
developed and with a diversified and integrated economic (and social) fabric. This does not 
mean  this  type  of  local  system  is  less  structured  or  does  not  have  strong  links  and 
relationships  among  its  constituent  elements,  although  they  may  not  be  very  visible. 
However, the fact is that the surrounding economic fabric has multiple ingredients that can 
be mobilized to promote the development of the constituent elements of advanced vectors: 
this is a characteristic that differentiates them clearly from local development vectors and a 
fortiori  from  the  other  types.  Thus  policy  measures to foment advanced vectors should 
focus  on  mobilizing  local  resources  to  prevent  the  erosion  of  competitiveness  which 
insertion  of  their  products  at  the  bottom  of  the  market  would  inevitably  cause if these 
systems  were  to  depend  on  a  cheap  and  plentiful  supply  of  factors  in  areas  (urban  or 
metropolitan) where such factors are certainly far more expensive.  
The policy instruments best suited to each of these types of LPS are evidently very 
different. The activities to be considered for embryonic local systems may be numerous but 
they will certainly be more basic. Experience in the field shows that in these cases basic 
ingredients such as courses on cost accounting and management are extremely useful and 
can be inserted in the initial stages of longer, more ambitious development programs. As 
for the more advanced types of LPS, be they centers or vectors, the appropriate policy 
instruments will involve larger volumes of funding and other resources, while also entailing 
greater risk in terms of the resources involved.  
In  any  of  the  four  cases  discussed,  policy  should  offer  conditions  for  local 
protagonists — firms, entrepreneurs, workers, public and private entities, and the formal or 
informal  associative  fabric  —  to  use  their  capacity  for  mobilization  in  favor  of 
development. This means the policy cannot and must not take the place of local actors. 
Moreover, if it is to avoid failure from the start it must not include measures that weaken or 
stultify  the  autonomous  development  of  the  local  system  and  its  social  forces.  Local 
institutions must be preponderant protagonists in any policy for LPS.   19
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